Russian language use in Ukraine after February 2022 Policy, identity and everyday integration
Budget: $30 – $250 USD
The paper is to be 18 – 20 pages of text. The paper should have a cover page, and a works cited section, although they are not included in the page count. Students may not use any paper submitted in another class. The paper is not to be a compilation of facts, but rather should make a clear argument concerning a political issue. The argument should be presented within a specific theoretical and methodological framework. The argument should be supported by evidence obtained through scholarly research, observations, research, or documented experimentation. Anastasiia Kudierova
Paper proposal
Russian language use in Ukraine after February 2022
Policy, identity and everyday integration
Ukraine has always been a country, where many citizens spoke both languages: Russian and
Ukrainian in everyday life. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russian language
became an enemy language. Since Russians attacked Ukrainians, many Ukrainians decided to
not speak this language. For them it's a language which is used by people who kill others and
destroy the country. Because Russian is the language of the aggressor state, many Ukrainians
began avoiding it as an act of solidarity and resistance. So, the government decided to make
schools, hospitals, government offices and public institutions - only use Ukrainian language to
communicate with people. Because of this my main question is: How has the war changed
language rules and habits in Ukraine, and how does that impact Russian-speaking citizens?
After February 2022, language became more than just a practical everyday choice. It became a
social and political signal. For many Ukrainians, speaking Ukrainian in public is now connected
to patriotism, survival, and unity. At the same time, millions of Ukrainian citizens are native
Russian speakers or grew up using Russian language at home, especially in large cities and in
certain regions, for example in Lugansk, Donetsk, cities which were occupied by Russia after
2014(iIn 2014 Russia occupied east of Ukraine). Many of these people are strongly pro-Ukraine,
support the army, and have suffered from Russian attacks themselves or their family members
got killed or went to fight. That is why this topic is important and I am writing about it - the war
created a situation where a language can be associated with the aggressor, but many citizens
still speak it because they used to do it and it’s hard to switch to another language in one day.
This creates a tension between national unity and social inclusion.
In this proposal, I argue that post-2022 changes in language use are shaping integration in two
ways at the same time. On one side, making people speak Ukrainian language in public life
helps strengthen a shared civic identity and reduces Russia’s influence. It supports the idea of
Ukraine as an independent political nation with its own language, culture, institutions, and public
space. On the other hand, quick social change can also produce pressure and stigma in
everyday interactions. Even if the goal is unity, people who still speak Russian may sometimes
feel judged or even feel the need to prove loyalty in situations where language becomes a
“test.” Because of this, language policy and everyday language behavior can create both
integration and division depending on the context. People started judging those who speak
russian, saying if you speak this language - go live in Russia, if you’re against the war- please
speak ukrainian. That’s why when I’m in public places back home- I always speak Ukrainian, so
I won't make anyone mad or think that I do not care about the war.
To study this, I will focus on the relationship between three connected forces: institutions,
identity, and everyday life. First, institutions matter because they set the rules and expectations
for public communication. When schools, public offices, and hospitals operate only in Ukrainian,
that changes what language is “normal” in public spaces. Second, identity matters because
people interpret language choices emotionally and politically during wartime. Speaking
Ukrainian can be experienced as resistance, while speaking Russian can be viewed by some as
unacceptable even when the speaker is Ukrainian. Third, everyday life matters because real
integration happens through daily experiences- how people interact with teachers, doctors,
classmates, coworkers, and strangers, and whether they feel respected and included.
My methodological approach will be mainly based on institutions and behavior, using identity
theory to understand the meanings. I will not be looking at language from a purely legal
perspective, nor will I be looking at it from a purely personal perspective. I will be looking at it
from the perspective of real policy changes. In the first part of the paper, I will be looking at the
main language rules that were introduced after 2022, including the way that the institutions of
the state support the default position of the Ukrainian language. In the second part of the paper,
I will be looking at the way that the language of the people changed, using survey research,
sociological research, and research into the way that the language of the people changed. In
the third part of the paper, I will be looking at the way that the changes affect integration, using
research into the way that the Russian-speaking people describe their experiences, the way that
the discourse around the Russian language is described, and the way that different parts of the
country or different ages of the people might react. Based on the logic presented within my
argument, I anticipate that the overall outcome of my research will be ambiguous but clear. I
anticipate that I will find strong evidence to support the fact that the war hastened the movement
toward Ukrainian usage within public life and increased the social expectation to use Ukrainian
within public life. I also anticipate that I will find evidence to support the fact that many Russian-
speaking citizens are adapting to these new social expectations by using Ukrainian within public
life while still using Russian within private life; for many citizens, this adaptation actually
increases feelings of belonging to Ukraine. I also anticipate that I will find evidence to support
the fact that for many Russian-speaking citizens, the change causes them stress or social
tension when language is linked to moral judgment and suspicion. This is important because
integration is not simply based on language usage but also on whether citizens feel fully
accepted as part of the civic nation. The reason why I think this is probable is that war evokes a
need to be unified and to have clear symbols of this unity. So, language is one of the most
common symbols of this unity, and so it is natural that it becomes politicized. At the same time,
language is very personal and linked to our families and our childhoods, and so it does not
change quickly. When the rules and norms of society change rapidly, some people adapt well to
this change, while others feel a need to adjust and fear being perceived incorrectly. My research
will show how the language change in Ukraine is working as a tool of nation-building and
resistance, and also the challenges of integration that may emerge when a bilingual society
becomes linguistically unified through the pressure of war.
no ai , it has to be only human writen , AI can not be used in this paper
Paper proposal
Russian language use in Ukraine after February 2022
Policy, identity and everyday integration
Ukraine has always been a country, where many citizens spoke both languages: Russian and
Ukrainian in everyday life. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russian language
became an enemy language. Since Russians attacked Ukrainians, many Ukrainians decided to
not speak this language. For them it's a language which is used by people who kill others and
destroy the country. Because Russian is the language of the aggressor state, many Ukrainians
began avoiding it as an act of solidarity and resistance. So, the government decided to make
schools, hospitals, government offices and public institutions - only use Ukrainian language to
communicate with people. Because of this my main question is: How has the war changed
language rules and habits in Ukraine, and how does that impact Russian-speaking citizens?
After February 2022, language became more than just a practical everyday choice. It became a
social and political signal. For many Ukrainians, speaking Ukrainian in public is now connected
to patriotism, survival, and unity. At the same time, millions of Ukrainian citizens are native
Russian speakers or grew up using Russian language at home, especially in large cities and in
certain regions, for example in Lugansk, Donetsk, cities which were occupied by Russia after
2014(iIn 2014 Russia occupied east of Ukraine). Many of these people are strongly pro-Ukraine,
support the army, and have suffered from Russian attacks themselves or their family members
got killed or went to fight. That is why this topic is important and I am writing about it - the war
created a situation where a language can be associated with the aggressor, but many citizens
still speak it because they used to do it and it’s hard to switch to another language in one day.
This creates a tension between national unity and social inclusion.
In this proposal, I argue that post-2022 changes in language use are shaping integration in two
ways at the same time. On one side, making people speak Ukrainian language in public life
helps strengthen a shared civic identity and reduces Russia’s influence. It supports the idea of
Ukraine as an independent political nation with its own language, culture, institutions, and public
space. On the other hand, quick social change can also produce pressure and stigma in
everyday interactions. Even if the goal is unity, people who still speak Russian may sometimes
feel judged or even feel the need to prove loyalty in situations where language becomes a
“test.” Because of this, language policy and everyday language behavior can create both
integration and division depending on the context. People started judging those who speak
russian, saying if you speak this language - go live in Russia, if you’re against the war- please
speak ukrainian. That’s why when I’m in public places back home- I always speak Ukrainian, so
I won't make anyone mad or think that I do not care about the war.
To study this, I will focus on the relationship between three connected forces: institutions,
identity, and everyday life. First, institutions matter because they set the rules and expectations
for public communication. When schools, public offices, and hospitals operate only in Ukrainian,
that changes what language is “normal” in public spaces. Second, identity matters because
people interpret language choices emotionally and politically during wartime. Speaking
Ukrainian can be experienced as resistance, while speaking Russian can be viewed by some as
unacceptable even when the speaker is Ukrainian. Third, everyday life matters because real
integration happens through daily experiences- how people interact with teachers, doctors,
classmates, coworkers, and strangers, and whether they feel respected and included.
My methodological approach will be mainly based on institutions and behavior, using identity
theory to understand the meanings. I will not be looking at language from a purely legal
perspective, nor will I be looking at it from a purely personal perspective. I will be looking at it
from the perspective of real policy changes. In the first part of the paper, I will be looking at the
main language rules that were introduced after 2022, including the way that the institutions of
the state support the default position of the Ukrainian language. In the second part of the paper,
I will be looking at the way that the language of the people changed, using survey research,
sociological research, and research into the way that the language of the people changed. In
the third part of the paper, I will be looking at the way that the changes affect integration, using
research into the way that the Russian-speaking people describe their experiences, the way that
the discourse around the Russian language is described, and the way that different parts of the
country or different ages of the people might react. Based on the logic presented within my
argument, I anticipate that the overall outcome of my research will be ambiguous but clear. I
anticipate that I will find strong evidence to support the fact that the war hastened the movement
toward Ukrainian usage within public life and increased the social expectation to use Ukrainian
within public life. I also anticipate that I will find evidence to support the fact that many Russian-
speaking citizens are adapting to these new social expectations by using Ukrainian within public
life while still using Russian within private life; for many citizens, this adaptation actually
increases feelings of belonging to Ukraine. I also anticipate that I will find evidence to support
the fact that for many Russian-speaking citizens, the change causes them stress or social
tension when language is linked to moral judgment and suspicion. This is important because
integration is not simply based on language usage but also on whether citizens feel fully
accepted as part of the civic nation. The reason why I think this is probable is that war evokes a
need to be unified and to have clear symbols of this unity. So, language is one of the most
common symbols of this unity, and so it is natural that it becomes politicized. At the same time,
language is very personal and linked to our families and our childhoods, and so it does not
change quickly. When the rules and norms of society change rapidly, some people adapt well to
this change, while others feel a need to adjust and fear being perceived incorrectly. My research
will show how the language change in Ukraine is working as a tool of nation-building and
resistance, and also the challenges of integration that may emerge when a bilingual society
becomes linguistically unified through the pressure of war.
no ai , it has to be only human writen , AI can not be used in this paper